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Multi-Project Baselines for the First
Track of Joint Implementation?
ABSTRACT
The “first track” of Joint Implementation under the Kyoto Protocol gives host and
investor countries total freedom in choosing a baseline for a project reducing or
sequestering greenhouse gases. This is due to the fact that an overly generous
granting of emission credits leads to a corresponding reduction of the host
country’ s emission budget. Standardised, multi-project baselines can reduce
transaction costs, especially in relatively homogeneous sectors such as
electricity production or landfill methane collection. Host countries need capacity
to calculate such baselines which currently does not exist. “Boundary
organisations” can bridge the gap between technical analysis and strategic
considerations. Interviews with government officials and other stakeholders in
East European EU accession countries lead us to the conclusion that countries
have not yet realised the chances and pitfalls of baseline definition under the
first track, especially as they assume that the EU will define the “acquis
communautaire” as the baseline. However, this would make international
emissions trading more attractive than JI.
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SBSTA – Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
AIJ – Activities Implemented Jointly
BASREC – Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation
CCAP – Center for Clean Air Policy
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism
COP/MOP – Conference of the Parties (to the UNFCCC) serving as the Meeting of the
Parties (to the Kyoto Protocol (KP)). The first COP/MOP will take place after the KP enters
into force. Delegates from Parties that have not ratified the KP will be able to participate as
observers
EEA – European Environment Agency
EIT – Economies in Transition
EPA – U.S Environmental Protection Agency
ERU – Emission Reduction Unit
ERUPT  - Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender
EU – European Union
GHG – Greenhouse gases
IEA – International Energy Agency
IETA – International Emissions Trading Association
JI – Joint Implementation
NGO – Non-governmental organization
NSS – National Strategy Study
MNC – Multi-National Company
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCF – Prototype Carbon Fund
REC – the Regional Environmental Center
UNEP – United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WRI – World Resources Institute3
1. Introduction
1.1. The emerging global “carbon market” and the need for institution-building
The “baseline issue” treated here jumped onto the centre stage of international
climate policy after the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was signed in 1997. This agreement sets
binding constraints on greenhouse gas emissions of industrialised countries (the so-
called Annex B countries) for the period 2008 - 2012. It includes the so-called “Kyoto
Mechanisms” to ensure economic efficiency of climate change mitigation by allowing
emissions to be reduced wherever reductions are cheapest. There are four
Mechanisms: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI),
International Emissions Trading (IET) and bubbles. A large part of their rules was
agreed in the 2001 Marrakech Accords but specification of their details is still going
on.
While bubbles and IET are instruments on the level of countries and do not involve
concrete projects, CDM and JI allow Annex B countries to invest in projects that
reduce emissions in other countries and generate emission credits. While the CDM)
1
applies to projects in developing countries without emission constraints JI)
2 projects
are implemented in Annex B countries. Emission credits generated by JI or CDM
projects (ERUs or CERs)
3 are tradable and fully fungible world wide. As CDM host
countries have no targets, a thorough supervisory structure with an international
“CDM Executive Board” and independent “Operational Entities” has been agreed to
guarantee that CERs are real. JI has two distinct “tracks”. The first track is very liberal
and leaves choice of crucial parameters such as baseline determination to the
participating countries. It can only be used if the host country fulfils all – relatively
stringent - reporting requirements for Annex B countries (see Table 1)  as then the
government can be expected to be alarmed when it oversells emission credits from JI
projects on such a scale that its compliance is endangered. The second track is
similar to the CDM and applies if the host country does not fulfil the reporting
requirements; of course it can also be chosen voluntarily. It is overseen by a
                                               
1 Article 12 of the KP
2 Article 6 of the KP4
“Supervisory Committee” and the Emission Reduction Units have to be certified by
“Independent Entities”. The more bureaucratic Track 2, provides extra institutional
safeguards against host countries’ non-compliance, in case they do not have the
informational infrastructure to control compliance by themselves.
Table 1 : Requirements for the two JI tracks
Requirements for JI host countries Track 1 Track 2
Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol + +
Established assigned amounts + +
National system for 1) the estimation of emissions and 2) the
development of a national inventory
+
National registry for tracking AAUs, ERUs RMUs etc. + +
Annual submission of inventories +
Supplementary information
4 +
Designated National Authority (DNA) in place + +
National guidelines and procedures for approving JI projects +
Adapted from The Marrakech Accords and Declaration (UNFCCC, 2001)
JI projects are likely to be hosted mostly in the Economies in Transition (EITs) in
Central and Eastern Europe, since the marginal GHG abatement cost is
comparatively lower there than in most industrialised countries. To garner the
potential for emission reductions before 2008, some countries already now invite
investments into “early JI” emission reduction projects and grant post-2008 emission
rights from their budgets for the pre-2008 reductions.
While in the last years the CDM has attracted a lot of negotiators’ and analysts’
attention, JI has been sidelined. This may be due to the fact that JI generates ERUs
only from 2008 while CERs can be created already now. We want to discuss the
question of baseline determination in the context of the JI first track and the resulting
institutional requirements.
                                                                                                                                                  
3 The “Kyoto jargon” for these emission credits is either Emission Reduction Units (ERUs), for credits generated
by JI, or Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), for credits generated by the CDM. They are measured in tons of
CO2 equivalent.
4 To be elaborated on further in international climate negotiations.5
1.2. What is a baseline and why is it needed?
The overarching requirement for GHG reduction projects is that they generate
“reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would otherwise occur”.
5 . The
crucial question then is how “additional” is the project to what would “otherwise” have
happened? The baseline is the “otherwise”, the counterfactual scenario for the level
of greenhouse gas emissions without the project, indicated by the dotted line in
Figure 1.
6
Figure 1: The principle of a baseline
There has been a heated argument about the ways for additionality determination.
While some observers (Greiner and Michaelowa 2003) argue for a check whether the
project would be economically attractive without the emission credits others say that
baseline definition would automatically specify additionality (Jepma 2003).
1.3. Baseline institutions in the first track JI compared to second track and CDM: different
incentive structures
Under JI, any ERU “sold” to the investor government will be subtracted from the host
country’s overall allowance.
7 As under the first track the baseline is open to
                                               
5 This is the provision for JI in the KP and the Marrakech Accords (MA); for the CDM it is very similar, i.e.
“additional to emissions that would occur without the certified project activity”.
6 As indicated in Figure 1, the credits accruing from a project will be the difference between baseline emissions
and project emissions; high baselines thus result in a big amount of reduction.
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interpretation by the different participants, the host government should have an
incentive to keep baselines low: by selling more ERUs for JI projects than emissions
are likely to be reduced by the projects, the host government simply looses assets. In
the CDM on which the baseline debate has centred so far, the incentive structure is
much different: the host government would be happy with overly high baselines since
those would attract investment for CDM projects. In the CDM the host government
would not loose assets or have to worry about compliance with a Kyoto target (since
it has no target), and the projects would earn CERs for largely business-as-usual,
high-emitting activities, which clearly would not do much to reduce emissions. This
so-called “baseline inflation” or “gaming”
8 problem in the CDM has not been resolved
and is often thought to threaten the credibility of the Kyoto Protocol: Overly lax (high)
baselines will simply increase global emissions, since excess credits will enable
increased emissions without truly compensating emissions reductions. In so doing,
lax baselines might undermine the credibility of CER trading, which is essential for its
success” (OECD, 2002a: 11; see also Michaelowa (2001), Michaelowa and
Sugiyama (2001) and Matsuo (1999)). This is one of the reasons for the
establishment of a very bureaucratic CDM process that involves various decision
points at which public comments are invited, independent review of baselines is
required and ultimately decided on by the CDM Executive Board, an international
supervision body. For the second track of JI, a similar structure has been agreed as it
is feared that host countries that do not fulfil the reporting requirements do not keep
track of their emissions and behave like countries without targets.
To be able to negotiate first track JI baselines effectively, host governments need to
build effective institutions. The paper will first illustrate the theoretical arguments for
adopting so-called multi-project baselines
9, in order to then investigate empirically
whether such an approach might actually be adopted by host governments.
10 This
investigation will be based on a survey of government representatives in JI host
countries. We conclude that there is in fact no ready solution available for JI. While
multi-project baselines can reduce transaction costs for developers and provide host
countries with considerable benefits in terms of the control of their Kyoto target, the
                                               
8 “Gaming“ in the literature refers to self-interested behaviour on the part of the project developer which leads to
overstated baselines; see section 4.3  for more details
9 For a thorough discussion of what exactly multi-project baselines are, see section 5
10 This question has, to our knowledge, been somewhat neglected in the literature. A  rare exception, focussing
on Poland,  is Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) (2001); However, it explores options for the government rather
theoretically. Moreover, one of the authors of this study stated that the work in this direction has somewhat “fallen7
resources and capacity needed on the part of technical expertise and decision-
making processes in governments is yet to be developed.
2. Empirical  research
The empirical research is based on a set of interviews with representatives from JI
host governments (Section 6). The structure of section 6 was followed loosely in
these interviews. One key representative from a JI investor government has also
been interviewed on a more informal basis. See Table 2 and 3  for a list of
interviewees.
A more diffuse remainder of empirical analysis is based on informal conversations
and own observations within the “GHG Protocol Initiative, Project Module”, a multi-
stakeholder process coordinated by the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD), a business association, and the World Resources Institute
(WRI), an environmental NGO. This process is currently under development
11 and
aims at providing guidance on a project-specific basis for any business  that intends
to develop GHG reduction projects.
12 See Table 4 for a list of personal
communications. The results from this will be interspersed in Sections 4 to 7.
It should be noted that it was not possible to address too many technical details
relating to different types of projects. The study thus contains only one illustration of
the electricity generation and waste management sector respectively (Box 1), both of
which are considered to have considerable potential under JI.
                                                                                                                                                  
through the crack” (Interview 10) since Poland is now concentrating on developing a domestic emissions trading
scheme rather than developing JI procedures.
11 The conclusions drawn from (and possible errors made in the analysis of)  this case study are in no way the
conclusions drawn by any of the contributors to this initiative.
12 It thus aims at providing guidance also under JI and the CDM. WBCSD/WRI (2000) is the result of the
“predecessor” process and defines a widely cited standard for GHG accounting in corporations. This makes it an
already effective institution for transactions under GHG emissions trading schemes among companies. Such
trading schemes are also likely to be part of IET, the regime established by the KP.8




Country Organisation Position of interviewee
1 Bulgaria Ministry of Environment and Water Environental Policy Expert
2 Bulgaria Energy Institute: Private Consulting
Firm
Executive Director
3 Bulgaria EnEffect: NGO for Energy Efficiency Programme Manager
4C z e c h
Republic
Private Consulting Company Senior Analyst
5 Hungary Ministry for Environment Environmental Expert
6 Latvia Ministry of Environmental Protection
and Regional Development
Senior Official
7 Latvia University Technical Professor
8 Slovakia Ministry for Environment Climate Change Expert
9 Slovakia Center for Clean Air Policy Climate Change Policy Analyst
Table 3: Informal interview with investor government representative
Interview
number




Senter: Executing Agency of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, Unit Central and Eastern Europe
Manager, ERUPT
program






Organisation Position of person talked
to
Type of perspective
12 UK Environmental Consulting
firm
Consultant Verifier/Validator





14 Norway Verfication company Environmental Consultant Verifier/Validator
15 UK MNC in the oil and gas
industry
Climate Change Expert Project developer
16 UK MNC in the oil and gas
industry
Environmental Expert Project developer
17 South Africa Resource Recovery Firm
(methane capture)
Manager Project developer
18 USA MNC in the oil and gas
industry
Climate Change Officer Project developer

















3.  The setting for the baseline game: actors, dimensions and criteria for evaluation
3.1. Actors
The market for ERUs involves governments, businesses and possibly a range of
other stakeholders. After all, the main GHG emitters are private companies that are
registered in some country. Project developers will mostly be such private
companies, and they will be able to either sell ERUs on to their government or, if they
are regulated by their government, use it as an allowance to comply with those
domestic regulations.
Host country governments, when hosting JI projects, sell ERUs to the investor
government in exchange for the reduction in GHG emissions that the project causes
(and the technology installed by the project developer). The host country government
has both an incentive to attract investment to the country through JI and, as pointed
out above, not to “oversell” ERUs from projects.
3.2. The wealth of baseline approaches
There is an enormous variety of baseline methods. They can…
  be based on either historical, current or forecasted future values (in some cases
even ex-post data can be used to determine the baseline, see Box 1 on landfill
gas projects)
  be static or change over time (i.e. if technology is assumed to improve as time
goes by)
  have either a long or short “life”; If a baseline has a life time of 10 years, then 10
years after the project start no more reduction credits can be earned from the
project
  refer to different spatial scales in determining business-as-usual: what would
otherwise happen might be determined by looking at sectoral, national or global
developments,
  refer to different technologies in determining business-as-usual: (e.g. coal for gas
projects or other gas projects for gas projects),10
  determine business-as-usual by referring to what would be a financially most
attractive alternative (investment assessment)
  determine business-as-usual by referring to what is required by law (regulatory
assessment)
3.3. Criteria for the evaluation of baseline methodologies: trade-offs and harmonies
13
Assumptions are likely to come from all of economic, technological, regulatory and
financial analysis, making baseline setting a rather interdisciplinary task. Especially in
case of limited data availability, the art of assumption-setting becomes crucial.
Methods and assumptions have to be specified clearly and to be made accessible for
review.
As discussed above, overly lax (high) baselines (in other words, they are not
stringent enough) will allow a project to generate a lot of emission credits without
causing emissions reductions. This would go against the host country’s interest since
it would take credits away from it without entailing the claimed reductions. The host
country would thus face a higher risk of not complying with its Kyoto target. This can
also happen through so-called “cherry-picking” which involves crediting in JI projects
of “no-regrets” opportunities. While a lot of credits would have been sold in such
projects, the host country would be left only with expensive abatement options.
Concerns about additionality, stringency or environmental risk naturally go against
the desire of the project developer (PD) to have the highest financial return possible
from the sale of emission reductions and thus to overstate the baseline when
developing a project-specific scenario or to “free-ride” when he is allowed to use a
multi-project baseline which is actually too high when applied to the project.
Predictability of credits to be obtained is important to business since GHG projects
are risky investments. Business will also argue for low transaction cost which
promotes standardisation.
                                               
13 These criteria are among the most common ones listed in most guidelines and papers on baselines. See, e.g.
OECD (2002), PCF (2000), Lazarus et al. (2001)11
4.  Decisionmaking on multi-project vs. project-specific baselines
“The criteria that establish valid baselines […] set the standards that define CERs as a
commodity.  Putting in place a common set of environmental criteria is crucial. […]
Standard-oriented baselines that rely on […] multi-project and sector baselines can
potentially reduce development costs.  Moreover, experience from commodity markets
shows that private associations can be useful in developing standards and in
disseminating best practices (PCFplus, 2001: 16)”.
14
There are two approaches, multi-project and project-specific, that can be used to
establish baselines. These are two extremes of a “spectrum”.
Project-specific approaches evaluate emission reductions generated from projects on
a case-by-case basis, with project-specific assumptions for all key parameters; while
this approach is fundamentally open-ended (Lazarus et al, 2001) some level of
standardisation can be achieved in terms of the procedures and steps to be taken for
the baseline assessment. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development
and the World Resources Institute (NGO) jointly convene a multi-stakeholder process
developing standards/guidance for GHG accounting. They have already established
a standard for corporate accounting of GHGs, now the process for the “Project
Module” is under development. The purpose of the GHG Protocol is to provide
project developers with a toolbox that can help them to identify the baseline scenario
and calculate emission reductions on a project-specific basis. Tools can include
investment analysis, regulatory analysis or the control-group approach. Governments
could accept baselines set up under the Protocol if industry commits to credible self
control.
Multi-project approaches can be applied to many different projects of a similar type.
They can be at many levels of aggregation such as by technology or sector (see
“baseline dimensions”), with multi-project figures or assumptions for all key
parameters; the baseline is equivalent to an “activity standard” or policy target that is
aggregated at a certain level (PROBASE 2003). Although baselines that could be
applied to more than one project may be costly to develop at the outset (i.e. for the
scheme administrator), they could lead to economies of scale and facilitate project
preparation once initial guidance is established. Now, it is quite straightforward that,12
for project developers, in weighing up transaction costs and credits, what counts is
the money that comes out in the bottom line (PC 17). Thus the use of a multi-project
baseline will not always result in the satisfaction of the project developer, as is shown
by this example: “When using CERUPT
15 country guidelines, we found out that they
were so conservative that we estimated that we would be generating 30% less CERs
using it than if we used our project-specific baseline (also conservative), which is a
big financial impact on a small project that benefits from the revenue from CERs. So,
we have tried to calculate it by assessing current and projected supply to the grid,
and applying emission factors. In the future, were there to be a more appropriate
standardised baseline, we would consider using it, to reduce on transaction costs in
terms of time, effort and money (PC 16).
Theoretically, nearly all multi-project baselines are hybrid baselines, a mixture
between the two approaches, meaning that some key parameters are project-
specific, and others standardised. An example for a hybrid baseline would be a
benchmark that indicates emissions per unit of some service that the project provides
(e.g. 1 t CO2/MWh of electricity). In practice, however, most hybrid baselines that
have any standardised parameters are referred to as multi-project baselines. Project
types  where reductions are likely to be the same across projects (homogeneity of the
sector) and projects that have system-wide effects are more suitable for multi-project
baselines than highly site-specific projects. Multi-project baselines would also be
more transparent.
When using a project-specific baseline the project developer has to provide a
proposal on what the baseline emissions are. This creates potential for gaming. Multi-
project baselines are determined up-front by the governing authority, and enforced if
some project falls into a particular category for which the multi-project baseline has
been developed. “Multi-project baselines require that an institution with appropriate
authority and know-how (programme administration, government and international
bodies) has the resources and is willing to conduct the necessary analysis to
establish the benchmarks and algorithms” (Lazarus et al. 2001, p. 24).
                                                                                                                                                  
14 Even though this quote refers to CERs (i.e. CDM credits), it should be clear that it applies just as well to ERUs.
15 CERUPT is a Dutch tender programme to buy CERs.13
5.  What to make of counterfactuality: analytical challenge, impossibility or decision?
Governments can only negotiate baselines under JI if they have technical expertise
and are willing to make a judgement about future action. Judgements about what will
be done in the future, to some extent, are informed by judgements of what should be
done in the future (Ott and Sachs, 2000). This makes the baseline not only a matter
of uncertainty but also one of decision. It will always remain subject to often diverging
interests and demands of different players, such as project developers, governments
and local NGOs. Thus the problem of determining the baseline rules is as much of an
exercise in bargaining as it is a technical one.14
Box 1: Technical vs. political factors in baseline-setting: two analogous examples
Landfill gas
A potential GHG reduction project could consist of capturing
16 methane (CH4) emissions from
landfills. Those would be flared off, which converts methane into CO2 and thus reduces GHG
emissions. If it can be assumed that the methane flared would have otherwise vented into the
air, the baseline emissions are simply the amount of methane flared (i.e. the baseline can be
measured ex-post). However, this cannot always be assumed, for two very different reasons:
one is a technical one, and stems from the fact every landfill has some sort of cover material
(e.g. grass or other), which reduces the amount of methane that evades from the landfill. The
factors (relating to the cover material) which determine this “methane attenuation” are not yet
well understood.
17 The second reason is that a policy decision could actually require the capture
of methane from landfills. Both issues raise some uncertainty, as to what the exact reductions
are. Only in the first instance can technical reasoning be of any help in reducing uncertainty.
Electricity for the grid
The extensive literature on baselines for projects that save or displace
18 electricity production
from high-emitting sources seems to have reached a consensus which focuses on the
“combined margin” approach.
19 The combination consists of two “margins” which serve as
reference points in calculating electricity baselines:
Operating margin. This is used to calculate the electricity saved or displaced which would have
“otherwise” been produced by the electricity grid. Most electricity grids are fed by various power
plants. Across power plants, GHG emissions per unit of output (or carbon intensity, measured in
tCO2/kWh) vary considerably. Now what is the exact carbon intensity of the electricity which
would have otherwise been produced by the grid?
20 For valid economic reasons, it is not
accurate to assume that this is equal to the average carbon intensity of the grid. Mostly those
power plants that have low running costs (which happen to be wind, hydro or nuclear plants
since they comparatively low fuel costs (OECD, 2002a) will keep running when new electricity is
produced (or less demanded) while those with high running costs (like most fossil fuel plants)
will produce less. Again, the causal connection here is not well-understood so that the
determination of the operating margin baseline yields considerable uncertainty.
21
Build margin. Especially if the life of the baseline is long, then the electricity saved or displaced
which would have “otherwise been produced by the electricity grid” could have been produced
by a newly built power plant. I.e. the assumption that the grid’s composition will stay as it is (as
assumed under the operating margin) can be wrong. The OECD (2002) paper suggests various
statistical and modelling related methodologies to account for the build margin, but in any case
energy policy and other political considerations will play a large role in this respect.
Hence, here again, there is two different sources of uncertainty, one only could possibly be
solved through technical reasoning, the other involves decisions.
                                               
16 Landfill gas can also be used for electricity generation, see next example.
17 Expert estimates suggest that up to 15% of methane could be captured by cover material
18 GHG reduction projects in the electricity sector can occur either in electricity generation or in energy efficiency
(saving electricity, as it were).
19 For a recent summary of the literature and newest technical refinements, see OECD (2002).
20 …but now has been produced or saved by the project
21 If “dispatch data”  that is necessary to determine these connections is not available (which may be the case in
some countries or where companies simply do not want to divulge this information) , so tne authors of OECD
(2002: Footnote 28) state, ““The issue of which resources to exclude [from the baseline, i.e. those with low
running costs that will run anyway] likely deserves closer examination, which could be done through case studies,
for example“.15
6.  The potential for multi-project baselines set by JI host governments
This section will set out the main results from the interview survey carried out with JI
government representatives
22. It looks at the motivations and barriers as perceived
by host government representatives, as well as issues relating to the technical
paradigm. Finally, some results are presented regarding the question of what project
types, in addition to electricity projects, would lend themselves to a multi-project
baseline approach. It should be said up-front that in no country surveyed there is an
approved multi-project methodology in place for any project type.
23 Reasons for this
vary significantly, as does the enthusiasm regarding the suggestion that there could
be one.
Surprisingly enough, in several countries (Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary) there didn’t
even seem to be full understanding of what the difference between track 1 and 2 JI
is, whereas this was all too clear for the Dutch government: “If they fully comply with
all the criteria then everything would be much less hassle for us. Regarding multi-
project baselines, we would just make a deal and that’s it!” (Interview 10). This
situation certainly highlights the need for more capacity-building in some JI




A clear motivation for host governments is to reinstate their position in the decision-
making process on baselines vis-à-vis the investor government. This can be made
very clear by referring to their reaction to a multi-project baseline that has already
been developed for electricity projects by the Dutch government as part of the
                                               
22 As can be seen from Table 2, interviewees also included professionals in private firms or NGOs working closely
together with the government. When considered relevant, this distinction in perspective will be emphasised.
23 It should be noted that Bulgaria seems to be quite far in developing an energy sector scenario with the help of
an economic model. For Poland an external suggestion which has apparently not been taken up is CCAP (2001)16
guidelines under their ERUPT scheme.
24 The Dutch have supplied such baselines for
each EIT.
While one interviewee stated that the fact that the Dutch government had taken the
initiative “is very nice of them, but it doesn’t work quite like that” (Interview 4),
another, in charge of the calculations with a national energy model, said that “I have
no idea how they did that but these figures are certainly wrong” (Interview 2)
25.
This indicates clearly that losses in accuracy can bring up conflicts.
26 While it wasn’t
exactly clear in any country whether the figures calculated by the Dutch were too high
or too low, the “host government also has the responsibility to ensure that there is a
safety margin for compliance under the KP. The host countries should take the
initiative themselves” (Interview 4, and others), since there is a definite “conflict of
interest” (Interview 3).
When indirectly confronted with this, the representative of the Dutch government
replied that “we have chosen those factors only by lack of something else, it is a
starting point, nothing more” (Interview 10).
Impact on transaction costs
The general direction is that wherever a lot of projects are expected and there is a lot
of interest from investors, it was agreed that in order to attract more investment, a
multi-project baseline for the power sector was urgently needed. This type of
comment came in particular from Latvia, Bulgaria and Hungary (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5,
6 and 7), where the interest perceived from industry and thus expected project flows
w e r e  s a i d  t o  b e  h i g h .
27 Recommendations and sector scenarios provided by the
government would “already minimise the paperwork”, and “if the investor wants to
come up with something else, then they can see if they want to spend half a year on
a baseline study…” (Interview 4).
28
                                               
24 See tables B1 and B2 in Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands (2000). It is explicitly stated therein
that aggregate data from the International Energy Agency (IEA) was taken and then a combined margin approach
was applied (see Box 1).
25 The same judgement was expressed in Interview 1.
26 See also the results from Interview 16, where it becomes clear that the Dutch multi-project baseline failed in
terms of accuracy in the CDM as well.
27 The representative from Hungary said that she does not “agree with approving every single project on its own”
(Interview 5).
28 Comments to the same effect were made in Interview 3: “if the project developer wanted to use something else
then the multi-project baseline they would have to provide some justification for that”.17
However, the conclusion that multi-project baselines are needed to attract investors
depends greatly on the expected flows of projects.
29 In an important comment, the
professional interviewed at UNIDO said that “transaction costs will come down in any
case, and the whole issue might take care of itself. It will be some sort of evolving
process with incremental improvements” (Interview 19). This suggests some potential
of the project-specific approach in terms of standardisation and learning-by-doing.
6.2. Decisions vs. technical analysis
The Bulgarian government interviewee stated that even with a model for the energy
sector in place, there was still great uncertainties regarding the business-as-usual
scenario, since the closure of the second unit of a nuclear power plant was still being
negotiated with the EU (Interview 1).
30 If the closure was to happen then the fuel mix
of the electricity sector was going to become much more carbon-intense since new
coal plants would have to be built.
31
The interviewee from the Bulgarian Energy Institute, which is in charge of all
technical analysis for the government, confirmed that even though macro-economic
modelling was used for the energy sector, they could only “follow what the
government decides on. The decision to close the first nuclear unit is the main reason
for our revision of the baseline we are developing” (Interview 2).
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In the light of this example, it was also clearly stated by Interviewee 3 that “the
calculations are easy, it is the strategies and the political decisions that are the
challenge in doing these types of baselines”.
It emerges also that “a national political decision for any baseline would be
preferable” (see also BASREC, 2002: Box 7 on page 80) both from the host country
(Interview 2) and the investor country point of view in terms of credibility: “If host
countries were to make a decision on multi-project baselines then please let that not
                                               
29 More on this in the section on barriers
30 The first unit is decided to be closed by the end of 2002 (Interview 2)
31 The situation is very similar in Latvia which imports electricity from Lithuania, where a Czernobyl-type nuclear
plant will be closed down in 2005 (Interview 7).
32 Note that according to operating margin considerations (see Box 1) the baseline then still “depends on the
operation of the other nuclear plants” (Interview 2), which emphasises the need for some expertise in what impact
energy sector decisions have.18
be made by one person in some ministry. They would also have to refer to reliable
data and argue a plausible case”.
33
Another issue clearly emerging from the survey is that even when decided on a multi-
project baseline, the result would not be free of negotiation also with potential
investors: the “baseline is a matter of decision and thus a matter of negotiation/deal
between government and business” (Interview 4).
When asked about the potential for a multi-project approach for small-scale energy
efficiency activities
34, the Slovakian representative replied that the viability of this
would depend on whether it was going to be acceptable to the investors (Interview 8).
A fact that is very relevant here is that the energy sector in the EITs has in the
meantime been largely privatised
35 which means that discussions with the industry
would be inevitable when setting up business-as-usual for this sector. PC 19 further
brought out that electricity companies in Russia, operating in a multiplicity of grids,
know definitely more about what would happen otherwise than the government does.
These points illustrate that the “government governance” of baseline-setting does
depend on the control already influenced over the sector in question. A related point
was made by the Hungarian interviewee: the legal status of a multi-project baseline
should not be just a recommendation, since “even regulations are hard to implement”
(Interview 5).
6.3. Barriers
Resources, funding and capacity
The absolute key barrier to the government taking any kind of initiative on baseline-
setting is that resources of various types are either decided not to be made available
or they are just missing.
The first case illustrates the obvious point that in some instances it simply “wouldn’t
be wise to spend public money on a huge organisational apparatus if we do not even
expect many projects in any one category” (Interview 8). There is also still uncertainty
about the price of credits and thus about investment flows into the country (Interview
                                               
33 Note that this comment on the part of the Dutch representative is based on the assumption that host
governments would not qualify for track 1 JI. See next section.
34 Large facilities will most probably be covered under an emissions trading scheme in Slovakia.19
4). These are more the concerns of countries that have decided, for reasons
elaborated on below, to shift away from JI altogether (Czech Republic and Slovakia
in this study).
In Latvia, the interest in JI is apparently great but resources were limited to one
person working on JI that had to deal with all other international environmental
conventions (Interview 6). A university institute is providing back-up.
In Bulgaria, a private company (the Energy Institute) is dealing with the development
of the national inventory and estimations for different sectors (Interview 2) since the
government is underfunded. Here, it was felt that generally the interest in JI is very
high but due to other political necessities in a financially difficult situation for the
country the capacity to manage JI was still very low indeed. There is still is no JI
strategy on the table even though it is clear that one is needed (Interview 2), and an
application has been made to the World Bank to provide a national strategy study
(NSS). The NGO contacted (EnEffect) is fully supportive of all the government is
doing on JI and has involved one person in building the national registry in an OECD
project (Interview3).
Hungary seems to be the most advanced in terms of technical capacity to implement
a JI strategy, which has been re-submitted at least to the Ministry of Environment
Committee for approval. Funding would be available to pay a consulting firm to carry
out a study about sectoral scenarios and the possible development of multi-project
baselines. However, there are other significant barriers.
Agency interdependence and coordination with other policy areas
The outside comment from the UNIDO interviewee (Interview 19) that “government
agencies will always be too uncoordinated to develop multi-project baselines” is not
quite born out in the empirical evidence: the representative from Hungary (Interview
5) emphasises the fact that a multi-project energy baseline would have to be
coordinated with the national energy policy, which would likely take some time but
should be feasible. Bulgaria seems to be the best illustration where on the one hand
there is a complaint that “the issue of climate change never really comes onto the
same table [between ministries]” (Interview 1) but on the other hand the Energy
Institute Director claims that his organisation is trying to be some sort of mediator
                                                                                                                                                  
35 For example in Hungary, certain parts are still in the hands of the public sector (Interview 5)20
between ministry of energy and ministry of the environment. This approach might be
a starting point for overcoming the gap between technical analysis and decision-
making.
Ratification and political will
As indicated by a comment from a consultant working together with JI governments
that “someone on a high level needs to decide something, otherwise nothing will
move there” (Interview 12), political will behind JI and its implementation is crucial.
For example in both Hungary and Bulgaria, it was said that ratification of the KP
should change the political inertia. The Hungarian representative said that now it was
only a matter of pushing their proposal for JI guidelines through, and agreed that an
amendment suggesting a multi-project baseline for the energy sector might be
feasible.
Revision of baselines
As regards uncertainty, it was generally agreed that the crediting life of the baseline
should be rather short since otherwise political agreement might be even more
difficult. Obviously frequent baseline renewal increases transaction costs, but for
example the experience in Latvia showed that some baselines developed under AIJ
simply “turned out to be wrong” (Interview 8). “The first thing is to agree on the
revision (Interview 5)”.
6.4. Project coverage
There is two project types other than the electricity sector which seems to yield some
potential for being covered by a multi-project baseline. This is on account of their
homogeneity. Firstly, a lot of small energy efficiency projects in schools and hospitals
could be carried out in a “very uniform way” (Interview 4).
The other sector is waste management, where government scenarios stating that
methane capture is not likely to occur could potentially increase certainty for21
investors. Since the financial situation is quite bad in this sector in any case
(Interview 1) it could replace resource-intense investment analysis. However, this
really goes only for Bulgaria and Latvia, which will not be under EU legislation (which
requires methane capture from landfills) for another 5 years. In addition, the waste
sector in Bulgaria is under the control of the Ministry of Environment exclusively and
would thus warrant easier political handling of a baseline decision.
For all other project types the expected volume of projects was not expected to be
high enough to justify multi-project baselines. In particular, industrial plants all have
specific and varying technologies, so that the project-specific approach is regarded
as appropriate. The same applies to boilers in small companies (Interview 9).
6.5. EU accession issues
As is well-documented only for the Czech Republic (PCFPlus, 2002), EU accession
and the resulting requirement for EITs to implement the acquis communautaire
36 is
likely to be a “severe drawback to JI” (Interview 10), since many of the resulting
regulations would make potential JI projects “business-as-usual” (see also Fernandez
and Michaelowa 2002). This assumes that the EU as an investor will ask for a
baseline reflecting the acquis. However, the EU would punish itself by such an
approach and so political discussions are to be expected if abatement costs within
the EU 15 turn out to be high,
7. Conclusions
It would certainly be beneficial for governments that plan to host JI projects to start
acting their part in the game, which will otherwise be dominated by investors and
donor countries against their interest (even if compliance is not necessarily
endangered in the host countries).
As appealing as they might seem in theoretical and intellectual terms, it has become
clear from the empirical analysis that multi-project baselines also provide no easy
way out of the baseline game. Overall, they only seem to provide moderate potential
                                               
36 The bulk of EU regulations including environmental Directives such as the Directive on Integrated Pollution
Prevention and Control (IPPC)22
to save overall transaction costs, depending on how much project flow is expected in
a given type.
While in the electricity sector a policy decision on baselines might be feasible and
desirable in some countries (i.e. mainly Bulgaria and Hungary of the ones surveyed),
it emerges here also that these attempts at a more centralised governance will not be
able to escape the need to involve negotiations in some way, be it with the industry
concerned or with the investor country. On the other hand, these negotiations might
be the closest to “common sense” as one can get.
Both technical expertise and a strategy on the part of the host government would be
required to make a multi-project baseline work. Going along with this, the two main
barriers perceived at this point in time are on the one hand the technical capacity and
the resources within government agencies, and on the other hand the slowness in
higher tiers of government to become mobilised in taking a decision.
Recommendations for JI policy
•   It should not go unnoted that first track JI, in making for more of a direct
bargaining process between the parties, has the biggest potential of saving
transaction costs. Investments in national systems and registries would certainly a
wise priority for any JI government now since 1) these are also the requirements
for IET and 2) in the context of EU accession high benefits from JI might only be
accessible in the short term. The host countries should press the EU for a clear
decision whether the “acquis” defines the baseline. If yes, investment in JI
capacity building and baseline definition would be misguided as emissions trading
is more attractive.
•   JI governments need more support from international organisations and donor
countries. Current capacity-building efforts need to be continued.
37
•   “Boundary organisations” such as the Energy Institute in Bulgaria should be
established to bridge the gap between technical analysis and strategic
considerations.
On a final note, domestic emissions trading linked internationally might be a very
viable option already now for all those countries that have some regulatory capacity
in place. This will and should ultimately be the way to finish the game with
                                               
37 see Levina 200223
counterfactuals, giving business flexibility and the government real control of the
overall target.
If it is very hard to decide and bargain over what should happen, why spend so much
time on trying to decide on something that isn’t going to happen anyway?
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